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Loan Sharks: The Birth of Predatory Lending. By 
Charles R. Geisst. Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2017. Pp. ix, 261. $26.00, 
cloth. ISBN 978–0–8157–2900–6, cloth; 978–
0–8157–2901–3, e-book. JEL 2017–1012
The title of this book, Loan Sharks: The Birth 
of Predatory Lending, is misleading. Most peo-
ple would expect a history of the early years of 
consumer fi nance, in which unlicensed high-cost 
lenders dominated. That is indeed part of the 
book.  But the book is more accurately described 
as a somewhat haphazard, popular account of 
major developments in US fi nancial history from 
1890 through 1935. The theme that the author, 
Charles R. Geisst, hopes will unite the topics is 
“loan sharking,” which he defi nes broadly to mean 
high-cost lending, whether for consumer fi nance, 
mortgage loans, or stock market speculation.  
 The fi rst two chapters discuss consumer fi nance 
and farm mortgages, as well as sundry other top-
ics, from about 1890 through 1920.  In that era, 
several states maintained a 6 percent ceiling 
on annual interest rates. As Geisst recognizes, 
“Even at double the legal rate, legitimate lend-
ers would fi nd it diffi cult to make small loans due 
to the administrative costs and work involved” 
(p. 81). In fact, banks of that era did not provide 
consumer loans; this gap was fi lled by unlicensed 
lenders, such as the salary buyers and pawnbro-
kers common in urban areas. Salary buyers were 
the illegal “payday lenders” of the time, provid-
ing workers with advances on their salaries at 
interest rates of 10–20 percent per month. Geisst 
does not explain the economic rationale for such 
high rates in competitive markets. As the era pro-
gressed, some states passed laws allowing annual 
interest rates over 6 percent on consumer loans. 
This permitted philanthropists, religious groups, 
and others to form mutual loan societies, credit 
unions, industrial banks, and remedial loan orga-
nizations to provide consumer credit on terms 
more favorable than those of the illegal lenders. 
In the case of Midwestern farm mortgages, local 
lenders often originated them and sold them to 
Northeastern insurance companies. Interest 
rates on these loans were about 2 percentage 
points higher than those for farm mortgages in 
the Northeast, a gap Geisst attributes to “loan 
sharking.” His economic rationale is muddled: 
“. . . it would be expected that the presence of so 
many competing lenders would have forced loan 
sharks out of business. But in reality, all lenders, 
legitimate and otherwise, wanted to be in the 
high-interest lending business” (p. 29).  As Geisst 
explains, in 1916, Congress passed the Federal 
Farm Loan Act, which created federal land banks 
to support agricultural credit markets. Other top-
ics covered in these chapters include: the green-
back exceptions clause; restrictions on foreign 
ownership of land; speculation on commodities at 
the Chicago Board of Trade; the absence of a fed-
eral income tax; the Panic of 1893; the rise of lay-
away credit for consumer purchases; the Panic of 
1907 and birth of the Federal Reserve System; the 
Pujo Committee hearings on “money trusts”; and 
stock market speculation and state Blue Sky laws. 
Chapter 3 covers the period from about 1920 
through 1927. In this era, the Russell Sage 
Foundation pushed states to adopt a Uniform 
Small Loan Law (USLL) allowing annualized 
interest rates of 36 percent.  It argued this was 
necessary for the development of a legal small-
loan market. Geisst (p. 232) views this rate as 
excessive, writing, “. . . the rates allowed under 
the USLL hardly were fair or just.  It is diffi cult 
to imagine a borrower realistically being able to 
repay debts when the legal borrowing rate ranged 
from 30–40 percent per year.” Nevertheless, 
many states enacted versions of the USLL and 
licensed, for-profi t consumer fi nance companies 
opened. The chapter also reviews the Florida 
land boom, the high failure rate of small state-
chartered banks, the spread of mortgage-based 
securities and commercial real estate fi nancing in 
New York City, concerns about German repara-
tion payments, the McFadden Act of 1927, and 
the rise of the call loan market for stock market 
speculation.  
Chapters 4 and 5 cover the lead up to, and 
aftermath of, the Great Depression.  In the late 
1920s, many households carried heavy debt 
burdens.  In some states, there were efforts to 
set more restrictive usury ceilings than permit-
ted under the USLL since, “…most had come 
to realize that lending small amounts at 36 per-
cent interest was no bargain for the borrower” 
(p. 155). Chapter 4 reviews the late-1920s debate 
over proper Federal Reserve policy in response 
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to rising debt levels and stock market fervor. As 
Geisst notes, nonfi nancial fi rms actively lent in 
the booming call loan market. Chapter 5 pro-
vides a familiar recounting of the government’s 
response to the fi nancial disruptions of the Great 
Depression. These include the creation of Federal 
Home Loan Banks to buy performing mortgages 
from savings banks, the Home Owners’ Loan 
Corporation to purchase delinquent mortgages 
from banks, the Federal Housing Administration, 
and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. 
Chapter 5 also discusses the Pecora hearings, the 
Glass–Steagall Act, reforming the Fed to create 
the open market committee and a unifi ed dis-
count rate, and Regulation Q.   
In a postscript, Geisst (p. 235) argues in favor 
of usury laws but, “No single fi xed rate is (or was) 
agreeable as a usury ceiling, and that casts a long 
shadow over the intellectual basis of usury ceil-
ings because critics maintain that any rate is arbi-
trary and political.”  Geisst (p. 236) proposes that, 
rather than a fi xed interest-rate ceiling, usury laws 
should set a limit on the spread over some bench-
mark interest rate to “. . . allow lending rates to 
adjust to market conditions while still protecting 
borrowers from the vagaries of the market.”
The book has several weaknesses. It tries to 
cover too many topics in just 236 pages and, 
necessarily, many are treated very superfi cially. 
There is no coherent framework that links the 
various topics. There are no tables or graphs to 
show trends or put data points in perspective. 
Despite this, readers certainly won’t miss one or 
two key themes, e.g., consumers often pay very 
high interest rates for closed-ended small loans, 
but readers will wonder why the greenback exclu-
sion clause is relevant. For those who would like a 
more engaging and focused account of consumer 
credit over much of the same period covered by 
Geisst, I recommend Financing the American 
Dream by Lendol Calder (1999).  
Economists will be frustrated that the book 
lacks any serious discussion of the factors that 
create variation in interest rates at a point in 
time.  High-cost loans can be explained by large 
risk-screening and monitoring costs relative to 
the size of the loan, risks of loan losses, lend-
ers’ market power, borrowers’ ignorance, etc. 
Geisst mentions some of these factors, but it is 
always in passing with no serious analysis. A good 
 counterexample is Kenneth A. Snowden’s (2013) 
history of the mortgage market at the turn of the 
twentieth century.  He attributes higher farm 
mortgage rates in the Midwest to high informa-
tion and monitoring costs faced by people in the 
capital-abundant Northeast who saw loan oppor-
tunities in other regions of the country.  This 
makes more sense than vague charges of “loan 
sharking”.  Similarly, Geisst includes no serious 
analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of 
his proposal to revise usury laws to set limits on 
spreads over interest rate benchmarks.  
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As the editors of this volume observe in their 
opening chapter, major changes have occurred, 
in both the US economy and in what research-
ers know about the effects of taxes, since the last 
major federal tax reform, the Tax Reform Act of 
1986. This book provides background informa-
tion on a wide array of tax topics and proposes 
relevant, research-based reforms. Each chapter 
covers a separate aspect of the federal tax code 
and is authored by an expert from that fi eld of 
research. Together, the chapters are stunning in 
their breadth, exploring everything from envi-
ronmental taxation, to capital gains and estate 
taxation, to tax compliance. A thoughtful dis-
cussion by another leading scholar in each fi eld 
follows each chapter. These discussions provide 
additional perspective on each of the topics.
The chapters generally begin with a back-
ground section covering both the history and the 
intended purpose of the current design of the 
